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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
oOo 
REPUBLIC INSURANCE GROUP, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-v-
BONNIE LOU DOMAN and 
TODD HADLEY, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
-v-
SCOTT DUKE, 
Proposed Intervenor and 
Appellant. 
oOo 
BRIEF OF PROPOSED INTERVENOR AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Court err in denying Scott Duke's Motion to 
Intervene? 
2. Did the Court err in granting Republic's Motion for 
Summary Judgment? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the granting of a Summary 
Judgment and the denial of a Motion to Intervene in a 
Declaratory Judgment action in the Second Judicial District 
Court of Davis County. Republic Insurance Group sought a 
declaratory judgment that a Republic Insurance Group policy 
issued to Bonnie Lou Doman did not afford coverage to Doman 
due to the alleged intentional acts committed by Todd Hadley 
BRIEF OF PROPOSED 
INTERVENOR AND 
APPELLANT 
Case No. 20838 
(the son of Bonnie Lou Doman) on Scott Duke (R-4). In order 
to adequately protect his interests, Duke attempted to 
intervene as a Defendant pursuant to the provisions of Rule 
24(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the 
alternative, Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(R-55). Prior to Duke's Motion for Intervention, Republic 
moved the court for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R-25). Republic's Motion 
for Summary Judgment was based upon the failure of 
Hadley/Doman to respond timely to Plaintiff's Requests for 
Admission (R-29)• Duke appeals from the ruling on Motion to 
Intervene (R-90) and the Ruling on Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R-92). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 5, 1983, Scott Duke and Todd Hadley were 
involved in an incident resulting in injuries to Duke, 
allegedly having been caused by Hadley (R-2). Duke filed a 
Complaint against Hadley and his mother, Bonnie Lou Doman, in 
the Second Judicial District Court of Davis County, State of 
Utah, Civil Number 35245 (R-3). 
Republic provided Homeowner's Insurance coverage to 
Doman (R-2). Doman's insurance policy provided coverage for 
personal liability (R-3). However, the policy contained 
certain exclusionary provisions which would deny coverage for 
an intentional act (R-3). 
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Republic brought the instant action seeking a 
Declaratory Judgment that Doman's policy did not afford 
coverage for any liability which may have resulted from Duke 
-v- Hadley and Doman, Civil Number 35245, Second Judicial 
District Court, Davis County, State of Utah (R-l through 5). 
On February 25, 1985, Republic submitted 
Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and Request for 
Production of Documents to Hadley and Doman (R-21f 23). By 
April 26, 1985, Doman/Hadley had not responded to the 
discovery requests (R-29) and Republic moved for Summary 
Judgment based upon Doman/Hadley's failure to deny the 
Requests for Admission (R-25, 29). 
On May 14f 1985, Duke, pursuant to the provisions of 
Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or in the 
alternative Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
moved the court for leave to intervene (R-55). Duke had not 
been made a party to the instant action (R-2) and only became 
aware that the possibility of Summary Judgment was imminent 
through a conversation with Doman/Hadley' s counsel (R-56). 
Duke filed a "Motion for Intervention as Defendant" (R-55 
through 59) and an "Answer in Intervention" (R-60 through 63). 
Duke alleged that the representation of his interests by 
Doman and Hadley was inadequate and that he would, or may, be 
bound by a judgment in the declaratory action (R-85). 
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In its "Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment" the court 
stated: 
The Defendant's failure to answer or 
otherwise respond to Plaintiff's Request 
for Admissions within the required thirty 
days has resulted in the same being 
admitted, pursuant to the provisions of 
Rule 36 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
As such, Defendants have admitted each 
and every material fact at issue in this 
Declaratory action and Plaintiff is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
(R-92). 
The court then used this rationale in its "Ruling on 
Motion to Intervene" when it stated "Since the Plaintiff has 
been granted Summary Judgment, there is nothing left for 
Scott Duke to intervene in." (R-90, 91). The court then 
issued a formal judgment and order in conformity with its 
Memorandum Decisions and signed both the Order denying Motion 
to Intervene and the Summary Judgment on July 15, 1985, 
(R-94, 97). Duke filed his Notice of Appeal on August 13, 
1985 (R-99, 100). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Duke's interest in this case is different from that of 
any existing party. Duke's interest is not being adequately 
represented by any of the parties. Relevant precedent makes 
it clear that representation is not adequate if the original 
party is not diligent in defending the action or allows a 
default to be entered. In this case, the effect of the 
granting of Summary Judgment was identical to the entrance of 
a default. Either would foreclose any further action to 
-4-
protect the proposed intervener's interest. Close 
"cooperation" between Republic and Doman/Hadley also 
illustrates an absence of the adverserial relationship 
essential to a fair litigation of the coverage issue. 
Duke's interest will be impaired in the Declaratory 
Judgment action. This impairment is sufficient to meet the 
requirement of being "bound" by a judgment as required by 
Rule 24(a)f Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Duke, having met all the requirements for intervention 
as of right pursuant to Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, was entitled to such intervention. 
It was, therefore, error for the court to deny Duke's 
Motion for Intervention. 
Relevant case law purports to limit Duke's right to 
intervene in this case. However, on further examination, it 
is clear that this case is limited by its facts to joinder 
under Rule 20, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and cannot be 
extended to intervention under Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Furthermore, the purported "holding" in such case 
clearly goes beyond the issues presented on appeal. 
Therefore, such "holding" goes into an area of supposition by 
the court and is mere dicta. 
Duke also met the requirements for permissive 
intervention under Rule 24 (b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The questions of law and fact relating to 
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liability under Doman's policy are common to all parties 
involved. Duke was a proper party to the declaratory 
judgment even though his claim against Republic was 
contingent upon securing a Judgment against Doman/Hadley. 
It was an abuse of discretion for the court to deny 
Duke's Motion to Intervene. 
The court must also analyze the propriety of the trial 
court's Summary Judgment. If Duke's appeal of the denial of 
Motion to Intervene is successful/ and if the court refuses 
to reverse the Summary Judgment/ then Duke is left with the 
right to intervene in a suit which is already decided; a 
right which in such a situation is worthless. A review of 
the Summary Judgment is a necessary corollary to the 
examination of Duke's right to intervene. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DUKE'S 
MOTION TO INTERVENE. 
A. Duke was entitled to Intervention of Right under the 
terms of Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
intervention of right is available when the representation of 
the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be 
inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by the 
judgment. (Add. x) 
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In analyzing the interpretation of this Rule, the court 
held in Lima -v- Chambers, 657 P.2d 279 (Utah, 1982), that: 
"Adequacy of representation generally turns on whether there 
is an identity or divergence of interest between the 
potential intervenor and an original party and on whether 
that interest is diligently represented. 657 P.2d at 283. 
(Citations omitted.) 
The court added that where a proposed intervener's 
interest is different from an existing party, the 
intervener's interest is not represented. 657 P.2d at 283. 
In this case, Republic's interest is to have the actions of 
Hadley declared to be willful and deliberate, thereby 
avoiding liability under Doman's insurance policy. Duke, 
having suffered serious injuries at the hands of Hadley, is 
interested in maintaining the potential for recovery of 
damages should he prove victorious in his suit. Doman and 
Hadley are interested in bringing the whole matter to a close 
as soon as possible with little regard for the amount of 
damages awarded. It is, therefore, clear that Duke's 
interest is different from that of any existing party and it 
is, therefore, not represented. 
In Lima, an automobile liability insurance carrier 
attempted to intervene as of right as a defendant in a tort 
action between its insured and an uninsured motorist tort-
feasor. The trial court denied intervention and the supreme 
court reversed. 657 P.2d at 280. 
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The Lima court enunciated an additional analytical 
tool: 
Closely related to the question of similarity 
of interests is whether the interests of the 
applicant, even if assumed to be represented, 
is represented diligently. Representation is 
considered to be inadequate if the original 
party is not diligent in the prosecution or 
defense of the action or allows a default 
judgment to be entered. 
657 P.2d at 283. [Emphasis added.] 
Since Doman/Hadley failed to respond to discovery in a 
timely manner, and such failure resulted in the entry of 
Summary Judgment, Doman/Hadley have obviously not diligently 
defended the action. Since any recovery which Duke may hope 
to receive in his action is or may be dependent upon the 
outcome of the declaratory action, Duke is a real party in 
interest in this action. The absence of Duke does, as a 
practical matter, impair or impede his ability to protect 
that interest. In fact# if Duke is kept out of the action 
between Republic and Doman/Hadley, and the case is decided in 
favor of Republic, Duke's claim is in reality defeated in a 
proceeding in which he had no chance to participate. 
There also exists the possibility of collusion between 
Doman/Hadley and Republic. Republic brought this action to 
determine the availability of coverage should the action 
against Doman/Hadley result in their liability. Republic 
and Doman/Hadley then become involved in this action in such 
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a manner as to terminate any financial responsibility on the 
part of Republic for Doman/Hadley1s liability. This was, of 
course, due to the failure of Doman/Hadley's attorney to 
respond timely to discovery requests. It is obvious that in 
the event there is no insurance for Doman/Hadley•s liability, 
then Duke will be in the unenviable position of suffering 
serious injuries at the hands of a party who is unable to 
respond in damages. 
In examining a similar set of circumstances, the Lima 
court noted: "The close cooperation between Plaintiff 
and defendant in resolving the liability issue in this case 
evidences an absence of the adverse relationship essential to 
a full and fair litigation of the damage issue." 657 P. 2d at 
283. Such potential "cooperation" between Republic and 
Doman/Hadley seems to be exactly that which the court had in 
mind when discussing diligence of representation. 
Neither is it legitimate to argue that the supervision 
of the trial court has adequately protected Duke's interest. 
In determining whether the interests of a defaulting 
defendant (and hence the interest of the potential 
intervenor) were adequately protected by the trial court, the 
court has noted: 
We think the argument that relators interest 
will be "adequately represented" in respect 
to Count 1 because the court required proof 
of Plaintiff's cause is specious. It is not 
the duty of the trial court to subpoena and 
interrogate witnesses who might contradict 
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the testimony of plaintiffs or those who 
might testify to compelling facts which show 
that plaintiff is not "legally entitled to 
recover" the damages he claims. The court 
cannot, and should not, act as attorney for 
the defaulting defendants. Every practicing 
lawyer knows that, insofar as the issues of 
fact are concerned, the defaulting defendants 
are not "adequately represented". 
Lima -v- Chambers, 657 P.2d 279, 283-284 (Utah, 
1982) (quoting State -v- Craig, 364 S.W.2d 343, 
346 (Mo. App. 1963) ) . 
Duke's interest was not, therefore, adequately 
represented in the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Even if representation of Duke's interest by the 
existing parties is inadequate, in order to intervene as of 
right, pursuant to Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Duke must still demonstrate that he is or may be bound by 
judgment in the action. 
In Centurion Corp. -v- Cripp, 577 P.2d 955 (Utah, 1978), 
the court stated that Rule 24 should be liberally construed 
to achieve the purpose of eliminating unnecessary duplication 
of litigation. This sentiment was also echoed by Lima -v-
Chambers, 657 P.2d 279 (Utah, 1982). The Lima court then 
added that, in order to effectuate the liberal construction 
of Rule 24, the "bound" requirement would be met by a showing 
that the judgment would in some way impair the applicant's 
interest. 657 P.2d at 284. As demonstrated herein, if Duke 
is not allowed to intervene and if the Summary Judgment is 
allowed to stand, then Duke will effectively have lost his 
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right to recover for injuries which he has suffered at the 
hands of Hadley. Furthermore, Duke will have lost this right 
in a proceeding in which he was not allowed to participate. 
A clearer example of impairment of an applicant's interest 
cannot be found. 
Duke is or may be bound by the judgment and, having met 
all the requirements for intervention as of right pursuant to 
Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, he was entitled to 
intervention as of right. It was error for the court to deny 
his Motion for Intervention. 
B. The relevant portion of the court's opinion in Utah 
Farm Bureau Insurance Company -v- Chugg, 6 Utah 2d 
399, 315 P.2d 277 (1957) goes beyond the facts of 
such case and is, therefore, dicta. 
In the case of Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company -v-
Chugg, 6 Utah 2d 399, 315 P.2d 277 (1957), the court analyzed 
a suit brought for declaratory judgment to determine the 
rights of an insurance company under an automobile insurance 
policy. The policy contained an exclusion clause which 
suspended all coverage when the car was being operated by a 
driver who was under the influence of alcohol. The court 
noted that the "insurance company should not be permitted to 
delay the main action for the purpose of determining in 
advance whether it should defend Chugg in that action". 315 
P.2d at 281. The injured party had been forced into the case 
by joinder under Rule 20, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
-11-
The court then went on to note: " we want to repel 
any inference which may be drawn from this opinion that one 
who claims to be damaged by the negligent act of another is a 
proper party to an action by the insurer of the latter under 
a public liability policyf whereby a declaratory judgment is 
sought declaring the legal effects of the terms of such 
policy." 345 P.2d at 281. The court clearly did not analyze 
the propriety of intervention in such a case. By its factsf 
Chugq is limited in application to cases where the injured 
third party is forced into the case through joinder. 
In this case, Republic brought a declaratory judgment 
action against Doman/Hadley seeking an order that Republic's 
insurance policy would not provide coverage in the event 
Doman/Hadley were held liable to Duke. Counsel for 
Doman/Hadley refused to respond to discovery requests. 
Thereafter, Republic moved for summary judgment based on such 
refusal. Republic's Summary Judgment was granted. For all 
practical purposes this defeated Duke's original suit against 
Doman/Hadley. In Chugq, however, the coverage issue was 
being diligently represented by the insurance counsel. This 
is obviously not the case in Republic -v- Doman/Hadley. 
A further distinction between the case at hand and Chugq 
is that the Chugq holding is, in fact, dicta. 
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The Chugg case involved a suit for declaratory judgment 
by an insurer against the insured and the automobile driver 
who was in an accident with the insured. The case was 
brought to determine the insurer's right under the automobile 
liability insurance policy. After addressing the issues 
presented, the Court goes on to note that in the event the 
tort victim had objected to joinder " it would have been 
error to have compelled his joinder even under the most 
liberal view of Rule 20, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." 315 
P.2d at 381. 
As stated previously, the court then adds that the tort 
victim would not be a proper party to declaratory judgment 
declaring the liability of the insurer. This language, 
however, clearly goes beyond the issues presented in the case 
and into an area of supposition by the court. The issue on 
appeal was whether or not the insurance company was obligated 
to defend the suit because Chugg was driving under the 
influence of alcohol and, whether the coverage under the 
policy was suspended by virtue of its exclusion clause. 
315 P.2d at 278. 
The court thoroughly analyzed the affect of testimony 
about the alcoholic content of Chugg's blood sample which was 
admitted over Chuggfs objection. The court also examined the 
issue of admitting in evidence Chugg1s plea of guilty to 
drunken driving. The court held that both of these items 
were reversible error. After so holding and disposing of the 
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issues on appeal, the court then goes on to examine the 
joinder of the tort victim in a declaratory judgment between 
the insurer and the insured. The court at no time discusses 
whether intervention is permissible in such a case. 
Therefore, such language purporting to limit the availability 
of intervention is dicta and is no part of the holding of the 
case. 
Furthermore, later cases make it clear that the modern 
trend favors a liberal interpretation of Rule 24 and a 
generous granting of intervention. See, e.g. State Farm Fire 
and Casualty Company -v- Reuter, 294 Or. 446, 657 P. 2d 1231 
(1983), rev'd on other grounds, 299 Or. 155, 700 P.2d 236 
(1985). Insurance Company of Pennsylvania -v- Lumberman's 
Mutual Casualty Company, 405 Pa. 613, 177 A.2d 94 (1962). 
C. Duke was entitled to permissive intervention under 
the terms of Rule 24(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
If Duke was not entitled to intervention as of right, he 
was most assuredly entitled to permissive intervention under 
Rule 24(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (App. x). Cases 
which are supportive of intervention in Duke's situation have 
frequently done so on the theory that the interest of the 
intervenor arises out of the same contract and is governed by 
the same occurrences. "The questions of law and fact 
relating to liability under the policy are common to both. 
If, therefore, [Duke] is not a necessary and indispensable 
party, [he] is assuredly an interested and proper party to 
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the declaratory action." Franklin Life Insurance Company -v-
Johnson, 157 F.2d 653f 658 (10th Cir. 1946). 
In the Franklin Life case, the insurance company brought 
a declaratory action for a determination of liability under 
an insurance contract issued on the life of the son of the 
defendant. The complaint alleged the death of the insured as 
a result of self-inflicted gunshot wounds. The risk was 
specifically exempt from the coverage of the accidental death 
benefit provisions in the policy. The court noted: 
In declaratory actions brought to determine 
coverage under an insurance policy issued to 
protect the insured against liability 
to third persons, third persons asserting 
such liability have been held to be proper 
parties to a declaratory judgment proceeding, 
although their claims against an insurer are 
contingent upon recovery of a judgment against 
the insured. Ordinarily in an action for 
declaratory judgment, all persons interested 
in the declaration are necessary parties. 157 
F.2d at 658. [Emphasis added.] (Citations 
omitted.) 
The Supreme Court also analyzed this issue in Maryland 
Casualty Co. -v- Pacific Coal and Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270 
(1941). In that case, Maryland Casualty issued an automobile 
liability policy in which it agreed to indemnify the insured 
for any sums the insured might be required to pay to third 
parties. The insurance company also agreed that it would 
defend any action covered by the policy which was brought 
against the insured. While the policy was in force, there 
was a collision involving a third party and an employee of 
the insured. The third party brought an action in state 
court. The insurance company then brought an action in 
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federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment that 
the vehicle involved in the collision was not one hired by 
the insured and, therefore, that the insurance company was 
not liable to defend the action. The court noted: "It is 
clear that there is an actual controversy between the 
insurance company and the insured." 312 U.S. at 274, The 
insured had demurred to the complaint on the ground that it 
did not state a cause of action against him. The court then 
held that there was an actual controversy between the 
insurance company and the injured third party. There is 
reference in the court's opinion to the deleterious effect 
that a contrary decision would have on the uniformity of 
federal and state court judgments. However, it is still 
clear that in a declaratory judgment action brought to 
determine coverage under an insurance policy issued to 
protect the insured against liability to third persons, such 
third persons are proper parties to a declaratory judgment 
proceeding. 
All requirements having been met, it was an abuse of 
discretion for the trial court to deny permissive 
intervention under Rule 24(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF JULY 15, 
1985, AGAINST DOMAN AND HADLEY, MUST AS 
A COROLLARY TO THE MOTION TO INTERVENE, 
BE REVIEWED THROUGH THIS APPEAL. 
In order to accord full relief to Duke, it is imperative 
that the court analyze the propriety of the trial court's 
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summary judgment against Doman/Hadley. In the event that 
Duke's appeal on the denial of the Motion to Intervene is 
successful, it would be a hollow victoryf indeed, if the 
trial court's Summary Judgment against Doman and Hadley were 
to stand. The court's analysis of the trial court's Summary 
Judgment is a necessary corollary to the court's review of 
the denial of the Motion to Intervene. Furthermore, 4 
Am.Jur.2df Appeal and Errory § 175 (1962), states in part: 
"In some jurisdictions it has been held that a stranger whose 
application for leave to intervene has been denied may appeal 
from the final judgment in the cause." 
The view that a stranger whose application for leave to 
intervene has been denied may appeal from final judgment on 
the cause is also supported by League of United Latin 
American Citizens -v- Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., 527 S.W. 2d 507 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1975) cert, denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976). See 
also cases annotated at 15 A.L.R. 2d 336, at § 8 (1951). 
Similarly, the court in Commercial Block Realty Co. -v-
U. S. Fidelity and Guarantee Co., 83 Utah 414, 28 P.2d 1081 
(1934) noted that: 
It is often the case that an intervener 
has more interest in the subject matter 
of litigation then either the plaintiff 
or the defendant, to deny an intervener 
in such case the right to intervene or 
to say that he could not be heard to 
appeal from a judgment denying him such 
a right would be most unusual. 
28 P.2d at 1082. 
-17-
It would also be most unusual to deny him a right to 
have the entire panorama of his claims examined, instead of 
merely a review of the denial of his right to intervene. 
Therefore, in order to successfully and adequately review 
this casef it is imperative that the Order Granting Summary 
Judgment also be reviewed. To allow only an appeal of the 
Order Denying Intervention is to deny Duke an opportunity to 
present his claim. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
Based upon the facts and the law stated herein, 
Appellant respectfully requests that the Order Granting 
Summary Judgment and the Order Denying Motion to Intervene 
be reversed and that this case be remanded for a trial with 
an opinion which is instructive with respect to the issues 
raised herein. J^  
DATED this of November, 1985. 
KING & KING 
BV! Jfa*, 16e£A-
GLEN T. CELLA, Esquire 
Attorney for Scott Duke 
Proposed Intervenor-Appellant 
251 East 200 South 
P. 0. Box 220 
Clearfield, Utah 84015 
Telephone: (801) 825-2202 
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In the District Court of the Second Judicial DfatttfS COUNTY. UTAH 
IN AND FOR THE 
County of Davis, State of Utah 
BBS JUN 21 P H 3 48 
MICHAEL G.ALLPHIN. CLERK 
2HD DISTRICT COURT 
•BY: -<fi 
REPUBLIC INSURANCE GROUP, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BONNIE LOU DOMAN, et al., 
Defendant. 
0EPU7Y CLERK 
RULING ON MOTION 
TO INTERVENE 
Civil No. 36730 
The motion of Scott Duke to intervene came before the 
court on June 11, 1985, for oral argument, with Felshaw King 
appearing for Scott Duke, Heinz J. Mahler appearing for the 
plaintiff and Steven Lee Payton appearing for the defendants. 
After oral argument, the court took the motion under advise-
ment. The court now rules on the motion. 
Scott Duke relies heavily on the case of Lima vs. Cham-
bers, 657 P.2d 279 (Utah, 1982). In that case the Supreme 
Court said: 
"When intervention is permitted, the intervener 
must accept the pending action as he finds it; his 
right to litigate is only as broad as that of the 
other parties to the action." (657 P.2d at 284-5) 
Irrespective of whether Scott Duke is a proper party to this ac-
tion or not, he must accept the case as it is. What is the 
status of the case. On April 26, 1985, the plaintiff filed a 
motion for summary judgment. The defendants failed to respond 
to that motion. On May 8, 1985, the plaintiff filed a request 
for ruling on its motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 
2.8 of the Rules of Practice and waived oral argument. The de-
fendants have not responded to this motion. The case is, there-
fore , in a position for a ruling on the motion for summary judg-
ment. This court has this day ruled on plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment and has granted the same. Since the plaintiff 
FILMED 
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has been granted summary judgment/ there is nothing left for 
Scott Duke to intervene in. 
The motion of Scott Duke to intervene in this action is 
denied. 
Dated June 20, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
Certificate of Mailing: / 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Heinz J. Mahler, 600 
Commercial Club Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; Steven 
Lee Payton, 431 South 300 East, Suite 40, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111; and Felshaw King, P. 0. Box 220, Clearfield, Utah 84015 
on June 21, 1985. 
Deputy 0Terk 
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FILED IN CLERK'S Of FiCF 
In the District Court of the Second Judicial Dis tr ic t s COUNTY. UTAH 
1985 JUN 21 PH 3 ^ 9 IN AND FOR THE 
County of Davis, State of Utah MICHAEL G.AILPHIN. CLERK 2ND DISTRICT COURT 
BY. 0 
REPUBLIC INSURANCE GROUP, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BONNIE LOU DOMAN, et al., 
Defendant. 
OEPUTY CLERK 
RULING ON MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 36730 
The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was filed with 
the court on April 26, 1985. The defendants did not respond to 
the motion. On May 8, 1985, the plaintiff filed a motion re-
questing the court to rule on its motion for summary judgment 
pursuant to Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice and waived oral 
argument. On May 14, 1985, Scott Duke filed a motion for in-
tervention as a defendant. On June 11, 1985, both Heinz J. 
Mahler, counsel for the plaintiff, and Steven Lee Payton, coun-
sel for the defendants were before the court on a motion by 
Scott Duke to intervene in this action. Neither counsel indi-
cated any intention of doing anything more with regard to the 
motion for summary judgment. The court now rules on the motion 
for summary judgment. 
On February 25, 1985, the plaintiff served upon defendants 
Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and Requests for Pro-
duction of documents. Over three months have passed and neither 
defendant has responded to said requests. The defendants' fail-
ure to ansver or otherwise respond to plaintiff's requests for 
admissions within the required thirty days has resulted in the 
same being admitted, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 36 of 
the Rules of Civil Procedure. As such, defendants have admitted 
each and every material fact at issue in this declaratory action 
and plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted. 
i n FILMED 
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The plaintiff is directed to draw a formal order in conformity 
with this ruling* 
Dated June 20, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ / 
Bte^J- -y-
Certificate of Mailing: 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Heinz J. Mahler, 600 
Commercial Club Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; Steven 
Lee Payton, 431 South 300 East, Suite 40, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111; and Felshaw King, P. O. Box 220, Clearfield, Utah 84015 
on June 21, 1985. 
e p u t y XclerJc 
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FILED IH CLERK'S 0FF1CF 
DAY'.S COUHTY. UTAH 
1985 JUL 15 AM 10 4 9 
MICHAEL G..\U.PKm. CLERK 
' 2KO DISTRICT COURT 
BY. * _ J! DEPUTY CLERK 
D. GARY CHRISTIAN 
HEINZ J . MAHLER 
KIPP and CHRISTIAN. P.C 
ATTORNEYS FOR P l a i n t i f f 
600 COMMERCIAL C L U B BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111 
<801) 521-3773 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
REPUBLIC INSURANCE GROUP, : 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
BONNIE LOU DOMAN and : 
TODD HADLEY, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 36730 
H The Motion of Scott Duke to Intervene in this matter 
came on regularly before the Court on June 11, 1985, Scott Duke 
represented by Felshaw King, plaintiff Republic Insurance Group 
represented by Heinz J. Mahler and defendants represented by 
Steven Lee Payton, the Court having heard the argument of the 
parties and being fully advised in the premises, and pursuant to 
the Court's ruling on Motion to Intervene dated June 20, 1985; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. That the Motion of Scott Duke to Intervene in this 
action is denied. 
DATED this / r day of , S,sA, , 1985, 
BY THE COURT: FILMED 
y / / 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
MAILED, postage prepaid, pursuant to Rule 2.9, this 
24th day of June, 1985, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Order, to the following: 
Steven Lee Payton 
Attorney for Defendants 
Suite 40 
431 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Felshaw King 
Attorney for Scott Duke 
251 East 200 South 
Clearfield, Utah 84015 . 
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DAVIS COUNTY. UTAH 
G85 JUL 15 AHKM9 
MICHAEL G. ALLPHIK. CLERK 
2ND DISTRICT COURT 
D. GARY CHRISTIAN 
HEINZ J. MAHLER 
KIPP and CHRISTIAN PC 
ATTORNEYS FOR P l a i n t i f f 
600 COMMERCIAL C L U B BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111 
<801> 521-3773 
BY. 
DEPUTY CLERK 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
REPUBLIC INSURANCE GROUP, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BONNIE LOU DOMAN and 
TODD HADLEY, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 36730 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment filed April 
26, 1985, came on regularly before the Honorable Douglas L. 
Cornaby, Judge of the above-entitled Court, the Court being fully 
advised in the premises and pursuant to the Court's ruling on 
Motion for Summary Judgment dated June 20, 1985, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. That the Republic Insurance Policy #5150860 issued 
to Bonnie Lou Doman does not afford or in any provide coverage 
to Bonnie Lou Doman nor to Todd Hadley in the case of Scott Duke 
vs. Todd Hadley and Bonnie Lou Doman, Civil No. 35245, filed in 
the Second Judicial District Court, Davis County, State of Utah. 
-1-
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2. That neither the Republic Insurance Group nor any 
of the individual insurance company members of the group have any 
obligation to defend or otherwise represent Bonnie Lou Doman nor 
Todd Hadley in the case of Scott Duke vs. Todd Hadley and Bonnie 
Lou Doman, Civil No, 35245, filed in the Second Judicial District 
Court, Davis County, State of Utah, nor to pay or indemnify them 
for any judgment which may be awarded in favor of Scott Duke and 
against the defendants in said action. 
3. For costs incurred in the sum of $72.75. 
DATED this /S day of
 r/Z/y , 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
MAILED, postage prepaid, pursuant to Rule 2.9, this 
24th day of June, 1985, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Judgment, to the following: 
Steven Lee Payton 
Attorney for Defendants 
Suite 40 
431 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Felshaw King 
Attorney for Scott Duke 
251 East 200 South \ 
Clearfield, Utah 84015 
RULE 24 
INTERVENTION 
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be 
permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers an uncon-
ditional right to intervene; or (2) when the representation of the appli-
cant's interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant 
is or may be bound by a judgment in the action; or (3) when the applicant 
is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other 
disposition of property which is in the custody or subject to the control 
or disposition of the court or an officer thereof. 
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may 
be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers a 
conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or 
defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. 
When a party to an action relies for ground of claim or defense upon 
any statute or executive order administered by a governmental officer 
or agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued 
or made pursuant to the statute or executive order, the officer or agency 
upon timely application may be permitted to intervene in the action. In 
exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention 
x 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct 
manually signed copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF PROPOSED 
INTERVENOR AND APPELLANT to: 
D. Gary Christian, Esquire 
Heinz J. Mahler, Esquire 
Attorneys at Law 
600 Commercial Club Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Steven L. Payton, Esquire 
Attorney at Law 
431 South 300 East 
Suite 40 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
postage prepaid, this 22nd day of November, 1985. 
GLEN T. CELLA, Esquire 
